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Outsourcing of Information Systems Functions in 
Small and Medium Sized Enterprises: A Test of a Multi-
Theoretical Model
This paper, selected for the category “Best papers from 1959 to 2008”, was first published 
in WIRTSCHAFTSINFORMATIK 43(4)2001:339–350 and has been revised for reprint.
The paper examines the situation of information systems (IS) outsourcing in a business sector 
intrinsic to small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs). A survey among German SMEs in a spe-
cific manufacturing industry yielded the following results: Overall, the share of IS outsourcing 
in SMEs may be categorized as moderate. The IS functions in SMEs are selectively outsourced, 
i. e., the degree of outsourcing varies across different IS functions. Whereas applications 
development makes up the largest share, planning and management tasks/functions remain 
mostly within the boundaries of the firm. An assessment of internal resource deficits vis-à-vis 
external service providers establishes the predominant determinant which explains the varying 
degrees of outsourcing IS functions. Contrastingly, transaction costs and an assessment of 
the strategic significance of the respective IS functions seem to play a subordinate role.
DOI 10.1007/s12599-008-0008-1
1 Introduction
In 1987, Dearden proposed that the in-
house information systems (IS) function 
would cease to exist (Dearden 1987). He 
argued that external providers are in a 
position to specialize in certain services 
in the IS area. They would, thereby, 
achieve advantages in quality and costs 
over services provided in-house. Accord-
ingly, it would just be a matter of time 
that the transition of internal IS functions 
to legally independent service providers 
would take place along with the establish-
ment of a market for external providers. 
Only those firms in business sectors with 
a large capacity for IS would be excluded 
from this outsourcing trend. For these 
firms, Dearden predicted an increasing 
independence and market orientation of 
the IS department in the form of profit 
centers which are linked to the firm by 
capital (e. g., subsidiary or associated 
firms). With regard to this governance 
mode, one speaks of spin-offs (Heinzl 
1993; Heinzl and Stoffel 1993), where the 
ownership remains at the parent firm. 
When taking stock of the IS outsourcing 
landscape today, it becomes clear that 
Dearden’s predictions have only partially 
become true.
First of all, there is no clear evidence 
that large organizations or IT-intensive 
business sectors show a higher tendency 
towards captive as opposed to non-captive 
outsourcing arrangements. It is true that, 
for example, in Germany – as opposed 
to countries like the USA or Great Brit-
ain – the outsourcing market developed 
slower.1 Outsourcing was dominated by 
spin-off arrangements in the early 1990s 
(Heinzl 1993). However, this has changed 
over time. Many of the former spin-off 
arrangements were taken over by large ser-
vice providers (e. g. Debis Systems House, 
a former spin off from Daimler, was taken 
over by T-Systems, or, as another exam-
ple, ThyssenKrupp Information Ser-
vices – later Triaton – was taken over by 
Hewlett Packard) (Dernbach 1997). Today, 
IS outsourcing to external service provid-
ers has become a widely accepted alterna-
tive to insourcing and captive outsourc-
ing in German organizations (Lucacs 
1998). Moreover, large scale outsourcing 
deals, which were mostly absent in the 
90 s, are beginning to gain momentum in 
Germany. For example, Deutsche Leasing 
AG signed a $120 million deal with Com-
puter Sciences Corporation, where CSC 
took over all information technology ser-
	 	According	to	a	market	survey	conducted	
by	IDC	(Murphy	et	al.	999)	IT-Outsourcing	in	
the	USA	amounted	to	3	billion	US$	in	966	
and	increased	to	20.5	billion	in	998.	Up	to	
2003	an	annual	growth	of	3.%	is	predicted,	
corresponding	to	a	volume	of	38	billion	US$	in	
2003.	The	evolution	of	the	outsourcing	market	
in	Germany	shows	a	market	volume	of	.7	billion	
US$	as	compared	to	.3	billion	in	996	(Lucacs	
998).	This	reflects	a	relation	USA:Germany	of	2:	
which	can	be	adjusted	in	regard	of	gross	national	
products	and	proportional	IT-expenditures	
(4:)	to	a	relation	of	3:	(OECD	2000).
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vices for Deutsche Leasing, including the 
transfer of all its computer assets and 35 
staff members to CSC.
In spite of the increasing number of IS 
outsourcing deals worldwide (Lucacs 1998; 
Murphy et al. 1999), however, the in-house 
IS function has not disappeared. Indeed, 
most organizations that opt for outsourc-
ing do so selectively. That is, rather than 
outsourcing their entire IS function, they 
only outsource particular IS functions 
such as data center operations or systems 
development to external providers, either 
in part or in their entirety. This phenome-
non of selective outsourcing has been sub-
stantiated by numerous empirical studies 
in Anglo-American regions (Grover et al. 
1994; Lacity and Hirschheim 1993; Lac-
ity et al. 1996; Sobol and Apte 1995; Will-
cocks et al. 1996). Moreover, Apte et al. 
(1997) were able to show that the respec-
tive shares of outsourcing of various IS 
functions differed not only in the USA but 
also in Japan and Finland. In a like vein, 
a European-wide study by IDC revealed 
that outsourcing behavior in Germany 
can, for the most part, be described as a 
selective approach (Lucacs 1998).
The phenomenon of selective IS out-
sourcing raises the question for the deter-
minants of IS outsourcing. This question 
has been addressed by a significant num-
ber of studies on IS outsourcing (Ang and 
Cummings 1997; Ang and Straub 1998; 
Aubert et al. 1996; Loh and Venkatra-
man 1992; Nam et al. 1996; Poppo and 
Zenger 1998; Teng et al. 1995). However, 
only few studies have asked whether there 
are any differences between the determi-
nants of IS outsourcing of certain IS func-
tions (Teng et al. 1995). This has motivated 
us to reexamine the outsourcing decision 
with a special focus on selective outsourc-
ing. Moreover, this research seeks to con-
tribute to close a second research gap. It 
is striking that almost the entire stream 
of research has focused on studying the 
sourcing behavior of large firms, such 
as the Fortune 500. There is hardly any 
empirical evidence about the outsourcing 
decision of small and medium sized enter-
prises (SMEs). The recognition of SMEs 
appears to be particularly wanted in coun-
tries such as Germany, where SMEs play 
a significant role in the economy (Clem-
ens et al. 2001). Accordingly, the follow-
ing two research questions will guide our 
research:
1.  To what extent are individual IS func-
tions outsourced by SMEs in Ger-
many?
2.  Which determinants are responsi-
ble for explaining the variation in the 
extent to which particular IS functions 
are outsourced in SMEs?
In the following, a theoretical framework 
will be developed which hypothesizes 
about the determinants of selective IS 
outsourcing behavior of firms. The 
framework will then be transformed into 
a structural equation model and will be 
empirically tested using a SME sample.
2 Theoretical Framework
Based on an analysis of the theory of the 
firm, transaction cost economic (TCE) 
theory and resource-based theory may be 
adapted as complementary explanatory 
approaches to selective IS outsourcing 
(Dibbern et al. 2001; Duncan 1998).2 
Both theories are similar in that they 
attribute rationality to management, 
which – though limited rational or expe-
rience-based – focuses on gaining profits 
or pursuing economic benefits. Not all IS 
outsourcing decisions, however, may result 
from a strictly rational decision process. In 
1969, Heinrich had already taken the view 
that the evaluation of non-quantifiable 
goals, such as an increase in power, must 
be considered when evaluating the options 
of internal versus external provision of IS 
(Heinrich 1969). The importance of power 
in IS outsourcing decisions was substanti-
ated by Lacity and Hirschheim (1993) in 
their multiple case study on outsourcing. 
They were the first that applied power 
theory in the IS outsourcing context and 
found partial support for the notion that 
power and politics have an influence on 
IS outsourcing decisions.3 Accordingly, 
we recognize the power aspect beyond 
economic and strategic considerations in 
developing our theoretical framework on 
selective outsourcing, as depicted in Fig. 1. 
Subsequently, each of the six hypotheses 
(H*) will be derived from the three selected 
theoretical lenses.
2.1 Transaction Cost Economic Theory
The constructs of environmental and 
behavioral uncertainty as well as human 
asset specificity are derived from TCE. 
According to this theory, the question of 
external or internal provision of services 
(i. e., market versus hierarchy) is decided 
on the basis of a cost comparison which 
takes into account the sum of transaction 
and production costs (Williamson 1975, 
1981, 1985, 1990). For the purpose of this 
paper, transaction costs are understood 
as all costs of planning, adapting, and 
monitoring task completion within the 
individual IS functions under alternative 
governance modes (Williamson 1981, 
p. 552 f). These costs are determined by 
contingency factors such as the degree of 
environmental and behavioral uncertainty 
as well as asset specificity.
2	 	An	overview	of	previous	work	on	the	
determinants	of	IT-outsourcing	may	also	
be	found	in	Dibbern	et	al.	(200).
3	 	The	authors	have	no	knowledge	of	
studies	that	addressed	power	aspects	in	
respect	to	individual	IS	functions.
Fig. 1 Theoretical framework of IS outsourcing
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Williamson describes asset specificity 
as the extent to which physical or human 
assets cannot generate the same added 
value outside the boundaries of the firm 
as inside (Williamson 1990, p. 142). In the 
IS context, physical or tangible assets refer 
to all types of information technologies, 
such as hardware products, information 
and communication technological infra-
structures, as well as standard software 
products, which may be acquired from 
the market. These assets usually have lit-
tle potential for variation in specificity. 
They can usually be applied in the same 
or in a similar manner by other organi-
zations. Thus, there is no conclusive evi-
dence that they per se could be of high 
firm specificity.
By contrast, human IS assets may sig-
nificantly differ in their level of specific-
ity – both between IS functions as well as 
between organizations. Following Wil-
liamson (1981, p. 563), necessary and suf-
ficient conditions of human asset speci-
ficity need to be distinguished. The intel-
lectual abilities as well as special capabil-
ities (e. g. programming capabilities) of 
IS professionals can be acquired autodi-
dactically or through training. They are 
necessary for performing IS services, but 
not sufficient to be specific to a particular 
organization. Sufficient criteria are those 
that make the capabilities unique and 
valuable for a single organization. This 
is particularly the case if IS profession-
als have knowledge of unique processes 
and procedures of an organization that 
can only be acquired through a “learn-
ing-by-doing” process within the served 
organization (Williamson 1981, p. 563). In 
understanding how such unique knowl-
edge can be formed, it is important to rec-
ognize the cross-sectional nature of the IS 
function. Today, IS are an integral part of 
nearly every business process of an orga-
nization. Consequently, IS profession-
als need to have a certain level of under-
standing of the business functions that 
they serve. Thus, the extent to which it 
is required for an IS professional to build 
up knowledge about unique business pro-
cesses and user requirements provides a 
good estimate for the extent of human 
asset specificity. Moreover, it is often not 
sufficient to understand particular busi-
ness functions but rather to understand 
the flow of information between different 
business functions as well as the logic of 
inter-organizational tasks (Heinzl 1996, 
p. 280 ff). From an organizational point 
of view this is reflected by the frequency 
of cross-functional team and project work 
(Krcmar 1997, p. 243 ff).
It can be argued that the initiation and 
adaptation costs for IS functions charac-
terized by high specificity of human capi-
tal are higher for an external provider than 
they are within the firm itself. An exter-
nal provider must first learn to under-
stand the complex relationship networks 
and interdependencies of the client orga-
nization. Presumably, an external pro-
vider would be unwilling to make these 
upfront specific investments, since they 
prevent him from realizing economies of 
scale. Moreover, he would behave oppor-
tunistically in this situation, i. e., he would 
cunningly use every opportunity to over-
compensate for his specific investments 
at the expense of his client. Safeguarding 
against such behavior would result in sig-
nificant transaction costs. Therefore, the 
following hypothesis is deduced:
H1: The higher the degree of human 
asset specificity of an IS function, the less 
likely it is to be outsourced.
A second essential determinant in the 
“make-or-buy” decision, based on TCE 
theory, is uncertainty. It is impossible for 
a limited rational decision maker to incor-
porate all eventualities in the contract with 
an external provider. When a contract 
is set up, a certain deficit of information 
exists with regard to future changes in the 
requirements on the object of the contract 
(i. e., the IS service or product), e. g., due to 
new technological developments and busi-
ness changes (environmental uncertainty). 
It can be argued that the future demands 
on IS functions, which are strongly influ-
enced by technological change and inno-
vation, can only be vaguely specified in 
contracts. The effects are high levels of 
uncertainty in the formulation of a con-
tract and, as a result thereof, the possibility 
of high post-contractual adaptation costs 
(Lacity et al. 1995). On the other hand, 
the reactions of the contractual partner 
in critical situations (behavioral uncer-
tainty), which could be brought about by 
the aforementioned environmental influ-
ences, cannot be anticipated. The behav-
ioral uncertainty ref lects the potential 
of opportunistic behavior of an external 
provider. The following hypothesis may 
therefore be put forward:
H2: The higher the degree of environ-
mental and behavioral uncertainty with 
regard to an IS function, the less likely it 
is to be outsourced.
2.2 Resource-based Theory
TCE theory implicitly assumes, however, 
that the market generally is capable of 
providing benefits or services in the same 
manner and quality as the firm itself 
(Conner 1991; Demsetz 1991; Foss 1996; 
Langlois 1995). The enterprise is viewed as 
a unit without a past. This static approach 
is contrary to the dynamic view of the 
firm furnished by the resource-based 
theory (Knudsen 1995). It provides refer-
ence points for when resources are to be 
kept and expanded within the firm for 
strategic reasons and when they should 
be brought in from an external provider. 
Crucial for this consideration is, on the 
one hand, the analysis of the basic physical 
and human resources, given the question 
of whether they can generate a sustained 
competitive advantage. This condition is 
fulfilled in particular when dealing with 
firm specific resources which cannot be 
traded, imitated, or substituted (Dierickx 
et al. 1989, p. 1507 ff).
The physical (i. e., tangible) resources 
of the individual IS functions, i. e., hard-
ware and commercial software, cannot 
be deemed firm specific per se. Hardware 
components and standard software can 
be taken from the market at any time and 
can hardly be protected from imitation 
(Clemons and Row 1991; Mata et al. 1995). 
The focus, therefore, is to be placed on the 
human resources and capabilities within 
the individual functional areas. For an 
assessment of specificity, the same consid-
erations are used as with “asset specificity.” 
The constructs of specific assets and specific 
resources may thus be treated in an identical 
manner (Dibbern et al. 2001). Accordingly, 
the following hypothesis is stated:
H3a: The higher the degree of human 
asset specificity of an IS function, the 
higher its strategic significance.
The outsourcing of a partial function 
that incorporates resources and capabili-
ties which are of strategic value to the firm 
(“strategic assets”), appears to make little 
sense (Dierickx et al. 1989, p 1505). An out-
sourcing contract generally stipulates that 
human and physical resources of a par-
tial function are to be taken over from the 
external provider. However, since these 
resources are commonly placed into a 
new organizational environment, the pre-
requisites for expansion and new develop-
ment of firm specific capabilities or core 
competencies are limited. Furthermore, it 
can be presumed that the outsourcing pro-
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vider will pass on firm specific knowledge 
of its acquired resources to his other clients 
– among which direct competitors of the 
contractual partner may be found. Thus, 
competitive advantages may neither be 
expanded nor maintained. These consid-
erations lead to the following conclusion:
H3b: The higher the strategic signifi-
cance of the resources and capabilities of 
an IS function, the less likely it will be out-
sourced.
Until now, it has either been assumed 
that client and vendor generally have 
access to the same resources and capa-
bilities (TCE), or that the in-house provi-
sion of IS functions is superior in creat-
ing strategic benefits from IS. This view, 
however, neglects the fact that the mar-
ket is also able to learn from the past and 
to develop its own capabilities and rou-
tines based on available resources (Lan-
glois 1995, p. 92 ff). These resources can, 
in turn, be used by a client firm as comple-
mentary assets (Teece et al. 1994, p. 20 f; 
Teng et al. 1995). A firm will not make 
use of market competency as long as it 
can generate the same capabilities using 
internal resources. However, if deficits in 
resources and capabilities are diagnosed 
on the basis of a company’s strategic orien-
tation, the market may become an attrac-
tive alternative for the purpose of filling 
these gaps (Grant 1991, p. 131 ff). The 
larger the deficits and the less likely these 
gaps can be closed using the firm’s own 
capabilities, the higher will be the attrac-
tiveness of outsourcing. These arguments 
lead to the following hypothesis:
H4: The greater the deficit in the 
firm’s resources and capabilities of an IS 
function, the more likely it will be out-
sourced.
2.3 Power Theory
Power Theory can be understood as 
an expression of the behavioral theory 
which conceptualizes the firm as a politi-
cal coalition (Cyert and March 1963). At 
the core of the theory is the clarification 
of the relationships between the interests, 
conflicts and power of single individuals 
or political coalitions within the firm 
(Morgan 1996, p. 148).
The interests of each individual may be 
reflected by the formation of various inter-
est groups (political coalitions) within 
the firm. If conflicts of interest arise, the 
power and the politics of the individual 
parties serve as the ultimate medium for 
conflict resolution. Power may be defined 
as the potential of a party to influence 
the behavior of another party in a certain 
matter, whereby politics is the manner in 
which power is exercised (Peter 1981, p. 7; 
Tushman 1977, p. 207). Since the focus of 
this paper is on explaining variations in 
decision outcomes rather than in the a pri-
ori decision process, only the influences 
of power will be considered in the follow-
ing.
It is argued that an IS department with 
a high level of power will seek to main-
tain or expand its base of power whenever 
possible. Presumably, the power potential 
is reduced with every loss of assets due to 
organizational changes such as rational-
ization, restructuring, or outsourcing. For 
a department with relatively little power 
within the firm, there is little possibil-
ity of defending itself against such pro-
cesses. Indeed, there is often no incentive 
whatsoever for the affected departments 
to behave in a restrictive manner. This is 
often the situation when they find a higher 
power potential in their new position than 
in the original one. Accordingly, career 
prospects and opportunities for personal 
development may be more highly valued 
outside the firm. If the in-house depart-
ment, however, offers a higher power 
potential then there is little likelihood 
that one will be better off in the new posi-
tion within the hierarchy of the external 
service provider. In this case, resistance to 
outsourcing will be strong, and the power 
potential within the firm will be utilized 
to impede the process or prevent it alto-
gether. According to the power theory, the 
following hypothesis regarding the out-
sourcing decision is put forward (Lacity 
and Hirschheim 1993):
H5: The greater the relative power of 
the IS department within the firm, the 
less likely it is that IS functions will be 
outsourced.
3 Research Methodology
3.1 Data
In order to test the hypotheses on the 
determinants of IS outsourcing, data was 
collected using a questionnaire survey. The 
questionnaire was pre-tested with high 
level executives to ensure understandabil-
ity and answerability and then sent out to 
281 SMEs. The original sample was made 
up of firms in the federal states of Bavaria 
(113), Baden-Wuerttemberg (95) and 
Hessen/Rhineland-Palatinate/Saarland 
(73), all of which are part of the industrial 
sector relating to glass, ceramics, stones, 
and soils (based on Hoppenstedt data 
base). The questionnaire was addressed to 
the top management (e. g. the chief execu-
tive officer (CEO)) of the SMEs. A total of 
34 questionnaires were returned, which 
equals a response rate of 12 %. To ensure 
that the evaluated questionnaires provide 
a representative sample, the firms that 
responded immediately were compared 
with those that responded in a second 
survey round. The comparison was made 
using the firms’ sales volume and number 
of employees. No significant differences 
could be determined between the groups 
(t-Test, p<0,05).
Tab. 1 IS functions
System	&	Data	Center	Opera-
tions
Telecommunications	&	
Networks
Application	Services	(Devel-
opment,	Implementation	and	
Maintenance)
User	Support	/	Help	Desk	/	
Information	center
IS-Planning	&	IS-Manage-
ment
Installation,	operation	and	
technical	maintenance	of	
centralized	and	decentralized	
computers	(client	/	server	
systems)	or	systems	software	
Systems	programming	
Systems	control	
Security	and	catastrophe	
prevention
Construction,	operation	and	
maintenance	of	networks	
Administration	(and	integra-
tion)	of	data	and	application	
servers	(into	networks).	
Implementation	and	
operation	of	relevant	
services	for	inter-	and	intra-
company	information	
exchange	(e.	g.	EDI)
Development	of	one’s	own	
software	and	applications	
System	analysis	
Project	management	
Maintenance	of	existing	
applications	
Data(base)	administration	
Quality	assurance	
Implementation	and	adapta-
tion	of	standard	software	
packages	(e.	g.,	SAP	R/3)
Advice	and	support	
of	the	users	
Training,	instruction	and	
continued	education	of	users	
Problem	management	
Function	as	a	bridge	
between	other	departments	
and	the	IS	department	
Test,	procure,	install,	
introduce	and	maintain	
hardware	and	software
Long-term	IS-planning	
Integration	of	business	
planning	and	IS-planning	
Questions	of	principle	
Identification	of	future	
IS	innovations	
IS-Controlling	
Conception	of	system	
architecture	
Standards	and	methods
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3.2 Measures
Each construct was measured with a set 
of measurement items, i. e. questions. 
The unit of analysis for the majority of 
constructs was the respective IS function. 
Altogether five different IS functions 
were distinguished. Tab. 1 describes each 
of the functions (based on Mertens and 
Knolmayer 1998; Teng et al. 1995). The 
respondents had to answer each question 
for each of the five IS functions (see Poppo 
and Zenger 1998). Only the power items 
were related to the entire IS department 
as a unit of analysis.
The outsourcing behavior as the cen-
tral dependent variable in the study was 
measured using a single question reflect-
ing the percentage of the total budget for 
the respective IS function that is spent for 
outsourcing.
All of the independent variables – except 
for the uncertainty construct – were mea-
sured with questions or indicators that 
reflected the individual constructs. Due to 
the complexity of the construct of “behav-
ioral and environmental uncertainty”, this 
construct was operationalized using the 
so-called formative mode (Chin 1998b; 
Chin 1998c; Fornell 1989). This mode is 
based on the assumption that the individ-
ual indicators cause different outcomes 
of the construct. In contrast to the reflec-
tive mode, the individual indicators that 
together form the measurement model 
are assumed to be independent of each 
other. As such, the responsible indicators 
with regard to each of the five IS functions 
were (1) the number of suitable external 
providers; (2) the extent of future changes 
in requirements; and (3) the difficulty in 
measuring task performance.
Human asset specificity was reflected by 
the need of IS professionals in each of the 
IS functions (1) for knowledge about the 
processes and requirements of the busi-
ness units, (2) for knowledge about cross-
functional and inter-organizational rela-
tionships, and the need for (3) close collab-
oration with the business units, e. g., in the 
form of teamwork or joint projects.
Strategic significance takes the role of 
both an independent variable in respect to 
IS outsourcing and a dependent variable 
concerning human asset specificity. It was 
measured as the contribution of the indi-
vidual IS function to achieve a competitive 
advantage through (1) cost leadership, and 
(2) differentiation.
Resource deficits reflect the extent to 
which the ability of an external supplier is 
rated higher than one’s own with regard to 
(1) closing current performance gaps and 
(2) coping with future demands in each of 
the individual IS functions.
Power was not related to the individ-
ual IS functions but to the IS department 
in its entirety. It was measured through 
inquiry about (1) the level of hierarchy of 
the IS department within the firm, and (2) 
the degree of financial autonomy of the IS 
department.
For additional descriptive characteriza-
tion of the sample, four demographic vari-
ables were incorporated. The size of the 
entire firm was measured using (1) total 
sales and (2) the total number of employ-
ees. As indicators of the IS size, (3) the IS 
budget and (4) the number of IS employees 
were chosen. In order to be able to exam-
ine the relative financial importance of 
each IS function, the percentile share of 
each individual function in the total IS 
budget was assessed.
3.3 Partial Least Squares Analysis
The data analysis was performed using the 
component-based procedure for structural 
equation modeling “Partial Least Squares” 
(PLS) (Chin 1998c; Chin and Newsted 
1999). This procedure allows testing both 
direct as well as indirect relationships 
between numerous – not directly observ-
able – quantities (so-called latent variables 
or hypothetical constructs). Moreover, 
it allows to simultaneously assess the 
validity of the measurement items and 
the hypotheses, i. e. structural paths (as 
depicted in Fig. 1).
In recent years, the PLS-Method (Chin 
1998c; Chin and Newsted 1999; Wold 
1989), along with the usual method of 
covariance-based structural equation 
modeling (e. g., LISREL, EQS, AMOS), 
has increased in popularity. In addition 
to its greater flexibility in modeling mea-
surement indicators (allowing to model 
both reflective and formative indicators), 
the attractiveness of the method can be 
attributed, among other things, to the 
lower requirements in sample size and 
data distributions. Since the construct 
of behavioral and environmental uncer-
tainty has been operationalized in the for-
mative mode and due to the small sample 
size of n=34, PLS was selected as an ade-
quate data analysis method. The signifi-
cance test for all paths was performed by 
using the “bootstrap resampling” routine 
(Chin and Newsted 1999).4 To assess the 
validity of the reflective measures, the fac-
tor loadings and the construct reliabilities 
were used. In the case of formative indi-
cators, the weights of the individual indi-
cators were assessed following the recom-
mendations of Chin (1998c).
In the course of data analysis, the 
model on the one hand, was tested using 
the aggregated data set including all five 
IS functions, which resulted in a sample 
size of n=5×34=170 (see Poppo and Zenger 
1998).5 On the other hand, the model for 
each of the individual IS functions (n=34) 
was tested. This allowed to identify poten-
tial differences in the determinants of out-
sourcing across the five IS functions.
4 Empirical Results
4.1 Descriptive Statistics
The descriptive results of the study relate 
to the first research question that aimed 
to increase the knowledge base regarding 
the extent of IS outsourcing in SMEs. The 
demographics of the sample are illustrated 
in Tab. 2.
It is apparent that within the firms 
investigated, the ratio of IS expenses and 
total sales is quite small (mean: 0.7 %). The 
number of IS employees, with an average 
of five employees, may also be categorized 
as relatively small. This implies that there 
is a rudimentary division of labor within 
the IS function of SMEs.
Examining the degree of outsourcing 
across the individual IS functions reveals 
that the limited personnel resources 
observed in IS may not be explained by a 
high level of outsourcing in SMEs. Indeed, 
the degree of outsourcing can be consid-
ered moderate, with the means varying 
from 6 % to 31 % (see Tab. 3). The highest 
degree of outsourcing can be observed for 
the applications development and mainte-
nance function (mean: 31 %), followed by 
telecommunication & networks, system & 
4	 	In	each	case	N=200	“bootstrap-samples”	were	
generated.	This	resulted	in	N-	degrees	of	freedom.
5	 	Poppo	und	Zenger	(Poppo	and	Zenger	
998,	p.	862)	applied	the	same	aggregation	in	
their	empirical	study	regarding	nine	different	
IS	functions:	“...the	core	sample	was	nine	IS	
functions	across	52	companies	for	a	total	
sample	of	368	information	service	exchanges.”	
A	critical	remark,	however,	the	samples	are	
not	independent	because	the	questions	
regarding	all	IS	functions	were	answered	
by	only	one	person	in	each	company.
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data center operations, user support, and IS 
planning & management. A closer investi-
gation of the relative financial importance 
of each IS function reveals that, on aver-
age, the highest amount of money is spent 
for systems operations (30 %), followed by 
application services (27 %), telecommu-
nication & networks (18 %), user support 
(15 %) and IS management (10 %).
In order to better understand the sys-
tems landscape of SMEs, a control ques-
tion was asked on the types and the extent 
of standard software usage. Interestingly, 
the degree of standard software usage 
from external sources was quite signifi-
cant. This is particularly true for admin-
istrative functions. In the fields of finance 
and accounting, 76 % of the respond-
ing firms use standard software prod-
ucts, whereby the SAP R/3 package and 
COMET from Siemens are preferred. The 
use of standard software in the fields of 
logistics (32 %) and personnel (29 %) was 
less commonplace.
4.2 Findings from Model Testing
The model testing provides answers 
for the second research question on the 
determinants of selective IS outsourcing. 
Before analyzing the structural model, 
it is important to ensure that each block 
of indicators consistently measures what 
it is supposed to measure. Following this 
procedure, it became obvious that when 
testing the aggregated model and the five 
individual models for each IS function, 
the three formative indicators of the 
construct of environmental and behav-
ioral uncertainty are partly related to the 
construct not only with different weights 
but also with different directions. This 
ambivalence in the formative indicators 
leads to the supposition that each of the 
indicators may not only represent differ-
ent independent aspects of uncertainly 
but may also exert different theoretical 
influences on the degree of outsourcing. 
In order to better illustrate and under-
stand these different impacts of the three 
uncertainty items, the initial model was 
adapted in an exploratory manner. Similar 
to simple regression analysis, each item 
was treated as a separate construct with 
a single measurement item. The resulting 
path relationships are ref lected by the 
following three hypotheses:
H2a: The smaller the number of suit-
able external suppliers, the less likely an 
IS function will be outsourced.
H2b: The greater the change in the 
demands and tasks of individual IS func-
tions, the less likely they will be out-
sourced.
H2c: The greater the difficulty of mea-
surement of task performance of the indi-
vidual IS functions, the less likely they will 
be outsourced.
In this way, the explanatory power of 
the individual indicators can better be 
illustrated and falsified. Each indicator 
now represents an independent predictor 
variable. This modification of the original 
model structure, however, means a devia-
tion from the original research design. It 
can be regarded as an exploration within 
the confirmatory research approach (Chin 
1998a; Lee et al. 1997, p. 121).
In order to ensure measurement reli-
ability for the adapted model, both indica-
tor and construct reliability were assessed 
(Chin 1998c; Peter 1981). The reliability 
of the individual indicators per construct 
was assessed by examining the construct 
loadings. All of the loadings were above 
the threshold of 0.7 and highly significant 
at the 0.01 level except for three items that 
were non significant (n.s.) and two that 
were significant at the 0.05 (**) level. Con-
struct reliability was assessed by examin-
ing the composite reliability (CR) and the 
average variance extracted (AVE) for each 
latent variable. All of the calculated indi-
ces for the tested models were above the 
threshold of 0.7 for CR and 0.5 for AVE 
(Bagozzi and Yi 1988), except for one 
AVE value (0.41). Thus, overall, no sys-
tematic measurement error that occurred 
throughout all of the IS functions could 
be observed. Since the constructs “number 
of suppliers”, “environmental changes”, 
“measurement difficulties”, and “degree 
of outsourcing” were measured with only 
one indicator, the factor loadings are 
excluded from the parameter estimates 
for these constructs and fixed at 1.0.6
The test results for the modified struc-
tural model are presented in Tab. 4. More-
over, Fig. 2 provides a graphical presenta-
tion for one selected IS function “applica-
tions development, implementation, and 
maintenance”. The test results for each 
hypothesis are assigned to the respective 
path by including the path coefficients 
(standardized) together with their level 
of significance.7 As can be inferred from 
Fig. 2, only hypothesis H3a+ (strong pos-
itive relationship between human asset 
specificity and strategic significance) and 
H4+ (moderately strong positive relation-
ship between resource deficits and the 
degree of IS outsourcing) is supported 
for this particular IS function. Hypothe-
ses H2a+ and H2c- show a reversed sig-
nificant relationship. Hypotheses H1-, 
H2b- and H5- are insignificant. More-
over, a total of 38.2 % of the variance in 
the dependent variable – the degree of IS 
outsourcing – is explained by the model.
5 Discussion
Overall, the results offer evidence that 
there are some substantial differences 
in the determinants of IS outsourcing 
6	 	In	this	case,	measurement	errors	that	
have	an	impact	on	the	level	of	factor	
loadings	are	not	explicitly	accounted	for.
7	 	As	depicted	by	the	asterisks.
Tab. 3 Percentage of outsourcing per IS function
IS	Functions Sample Max	(%) Mean	(%) StD	
System	&	Data	Center	Operations 33 00 23 28
Telecommunications	&	Networks 33 00 24 30
Application	Services	(Development,	
Implementation	and	Maintenance)
33 90 31 32
Help	Desk	&	User	Support 33 90 18 22
IS-Planning	&	Management 33 50 6 0
Tab. 2 Demographics
Demographic	Variables Sample Min Max Mean StD
Firm	Size Sales	in	Mill.	DM 3 5 750 134 6
Number	of	Employees 33 25 900 525 532
IS	Size IS-Expenditure/Sales	(%) 29 0.0 .80 0.70 0.44
Number	of	IS	Employees 33 0 22 5 5
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between IS functions and that the IS 
outsourcing decision of SMEs is strongly 
influenced by resource constraints rather 
than strategic and TCE considerations, or 
power aspects.
The stream of reasoning of TCE is 
strongly based on the view that organi-
zations would opt for insourcing when 
the risk of market failure would be too 
high in economic terms. This risk is pro-
posed to be particularly high if the human 
assets required to perform an IS func-
tion are highly firm specific and if the IS 
function is associated with a high level 
of uncertainly. Obviously, there was no 
direct impact of human asset specificity 
on the degree of outsourcing in any of the 
tested models (across IS functions), which 
implies that the economic consequences 
of human asset specificity are not taken 
into account in outsourcing decisions by 
SMEs.
It is interesting to note, however, that 
human asset specificity consistently was 
found to have a strong impact on the stra-
tegic significance of each of the IS func-
tions. This means that firm specific assets, 
reflected by a good understanding of the 
idiosyncratic processes of the business 
units as well as cross-functional process 
knowledge, are important prerequisites 
for achieving strategic benefits from IS. 
The strategic impact of an IS function does 
not automatically mean, however, that 
such a function should not be outsourced 
(McLellan et al. 1995), as indicated by the 
mostly insignificant relationship between 
strategic significance and degree of out-
sourcing. Following on from this obser-
vation, it could be argued that SMEs gen-
erally put little emphasis on strategic con-
siderations when it comes to decide on 
important IS issues such as outsourcing. 
For example, in a study on IS management 
in SMEs, Krcmar found the consciousness 
of the strategic relevance of IS to be quite 
low among IT directors (Krcmar 1992). 
Similarly, a study on IS-controlling issues 
in mid-sized firms clearly showed that 
SMEs emphasized the importance of IS 
on the overall firm level, however, there 
was very little evidence for a downstream 
implementation and consideration of stra-
tegic issues (Spitta 1998). In the only U.S. 
based empirical study on IS outsourcing 
in mid-sized firms to date, Borchers also 
determined that there was no relationship 
between the construct of IS as a core com-
petency and the degree of IS outsourc-
ing (Borchers 1996); whereas in the base 
study by Loh (1993), whose research sub-
jects consisted of large U.S. firms (For-
tune 500), a strong negative relationship 
was ascertained.8
What stands out from the findings is 
the strong and significant impact of per-
ceived comparative resource deficits on 
the degree of IS outsourcing for the major-
ity of IS functions – except for the func-
tions telecom & network as well as plan-
ning & management. In 1991, Rumelt et al. 
showed foresight with the view that mar-
ket contracts would not only be taken into 
consideration when they are perceived as 
not to fail based on efficiency criteria but 
also, or even more likely, when firms or 
organizations themselves “fail” to ade-
quately perform a certain task or func-
tion (Rumelt et al. 1991, p. 19).
This, obviously, is the decisive factor for 
the majority of sourcing decisions in the 
observed SMEs. Deficits in an organiza-
tion’s IS resources in coping with current 
and future requirements appear to serve as 
an overriding contingency (Sambamurthy 
and Zmud 1999) or deviant factor (Brown 
1997) in many outsourcing decisions of 
SMEs. Based on this, the partially con-
tradictory findings on the relationship 
between the constructs “number of suppli-
ers”, “measurement difficulty” and “envi-
8	 	Borchers	(996)	states:	“The	concept	of	core	
competencies,	while	frequently	mentioned	in	
management	literature	and	embraced	in	the	
Fortune	500	firms	Loh	worked	with,	may	well	
be	a	prescription	that	managers	in	the	medium	
sized	manufacturing	firms	studied	here	have	
not	yet	come	to	understand	and	employ.”
ronmental change” and the degree of out-
sourcing become more plausible.
In terms of the negative rather than pos-
itive relationship between the number of 
available suppliers and the degree of out-
sourcing, it can be argued that SMEs out-
source application services, system oper-
ations, or the help desk function despite a 
small number of suitable IS service provid-
ers, because, for them, the elimination of 
resource deficits with the help of external 
suppliers outweighs the danger of resource 
dependency on an IS service provider.
Another notion of resource deficits could 
be an explanation for the contradictory 
finding that organizations were found to 
outsource particular IS functions to a higher 
(rather than lower) extent in case they have 
difficulties in measuring the performance 
of these functions (application services, 
systems operations, and user support). 
Here, measurement difficulties may be 
viewed as deficits, which could more likely 
be eliminated by an external provider than 
by the firm itself. Similar results could be 
found in a study on spin-off arrangements, 
where the desire for improved monitoring 
and control of IS was a strong driver for 
spinning off the IS function. Such an inter-
pretation is fueled by critics of TCE theory 
that question the supposition that the dan-
ger of opportunistic behavior could better 
(i. e. more efficiently) be prevented within 
the firm via the principle of authority and 
internal control mechanisms (Ghoshal and 
Insead 1996).
It is also interesting to note that with 
regard to the function telecom & net-
Fig. 2 Model findings for applications development, implementation, and mainte-
nance
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works, no significant relationship could 
be found between resource deficits and 
outsourcing. This observation could be 
related to limited experiences of SMEs 
with advanced information and commu-
nication technologies (at least at the time 
of the survey). Contrary to H2a+, firms 
prefer to outsource telecom & network ser-
vices despite a limited number of external 
providers and – contrary to TCE – when 
the degree of environmental change in the 
requirements and tasks of this infrastruc-
ture function is perceived to be particu-
larly high. In this case, outsourcing may be 
seen as a spontaneous, unreflected reac-
tion to an uncertain environmental situ-
ation which is caused by strong innova-
tional forces within the IT industry. The 
need for adopting so-called “enabling 
technologies” in order to stay competi-
tive in the market may be so strong that 
outsourcing is seen as a viable option to 
quickly follow suite (Beije 1996, p. 311).
Moreover, contrary to H5, power of the 
entire IS function had a significant pos-
itive rather than negative impact on the 
degree of outsourcing. That is, more power 
is related to more outsourcing. This obser-
vation can likely be traced back to the spe-
cific SME situation. The descriptive data 
has shown that the provision of person-
nel and financial resources for IS is lim-
ited in all of the responding firms. There-
fore, it might be inappropriate to relate the 
power aspect only to the situation within 
the firm. By contrast, the possible change 
of power through IS outsourcing needs to 
be considered. With an average number of 
five IS employees, the career, salary, and 
developmental paths for IS employees are 
strongly restricted in SMEs. It can there-
fore be argued that IS professionals will 
tend to favor the employment at an exter-
nal service provider and, accordingly, will 
have a positive attitude towards IS out-
sourcing even if they have a relatively high 
power level within the firm.
Finally, it is evident that the model’s 
explanatory power relating to the func-
tion planning and management is low. The 
decisive aspects for keeping this function 
within the boundaries of the firm obvi-
ously lie outside of the explanatory realm 
of the model. In particular, the aspects of 
coordination and control of an external 
service provider as well as the retention 
of capabilities for self-accentuation and 
direction in IS could prove relevant.
6 Summary and Outlook
This paper has focused on the situation of 
IS outsourcing in a specific manufactur-
ing industry with a relatively high amount 
of SMEs. The results have shown that the 
SMEs spent relatively little money on 
IS and that the degree of outsourcing is 
moderate. The majority of companies that 
opted for outsourcing did so selectively. 
Whereas application services make up the 
largest share of outsourcing, planning and 
management for the most part remains 
within the boundaries of the firm.
The main reason for outsourcing IS 
functions were internal resource defi-
cits compared to external service provid-
ers. This implies that IS functions are pre-
dominantly seen as necessary resources 
that are acquired from the most suitable 
sources which can be either in-house or 
at the external market. It does not mat-
ter whether the assets required to per-
form an IS function are very firm specific 
and hence may serve as the basis of a sus-
tained competitive advantage. Moreover, 
the potential economic risks that may 
arise from the outsourcing of highly spe-
cific IS functions are not reflected by the 
current sourcing decisions of the SMEs. 
This requires further research into the 
specific situation of SMEs. Are SMEs able 
to build up close relationships with indi-
vidual (locally situated) external service 
providers? Are these relationships built on 
trust and cooperation, which reduces the 
economic risks of outsourcing? Answers 
to these questions may explain why no 
significant relationship could be found 
between human asset specificity and the 
degree of outsourcing.
In a sense of “critical social theory” 
(Lee 1999, p. 31), it may already be criti-
cally noted, however, that the practice of 
small and mid-sized firms to outsource IS 
functions with a small number of available 
service providers and with difficulties in 
evaluating task performance increases the 
danger of dependency on a single provider 
(lock-in) and may lead to a loss of control 
over the service provider over time.
Finally, it should be noted that this study 
poses a number of limitations that need 
to be taken into account. First, the sam-
ple size can be regarded as small. Second, 
only a specific business sector of SMEs 
was surveyed. Research is necessary to 
determine the extent to which the results 
may be applied to other industries and 
whether or not deviations in IS outsourc-
Tab. 4 Path coefficients and t-values
IS-Functions Hypotheses R2
H(-)
Asset	
spec.
H2a(+)
No.	of	
suppl.
H2b(-)
Change
H2c(-)
Meas.	
diffic.
H3a(+)
Ass.	sp.	
Strat.
H3b(-)
Strat..
H4(+)
Res.	def.
H5(-)
Power
Strat. Out
Application	services -0.28
t:	0.88
-0.33**
t:	.94
0.08
t:	0.55
0.3*
t:	.70
0.75***
t:	0.99
-0.23
t:	0.89
0.37**
t:	.77
0.9
t:	0.92
0.56 0.38
Systems	operations 0.03
t:	0.2
-0.07
t:	0.0
-0.30*
t:	.38
0.54***
t:	2.3
0.355
t:	.8
0.083
t:	0.57
0.26*
t:	.80
0.26
t:	.08
0.3 0.44
User	Support 0.28
t:	.00
-0.29**
t:	.57
0.0
t:	0.54
0.4***
t:	2.68
0.6***
t:	7.0
0.37*
t:	.37
0.44***
t:	2.56
0.48**
t:	2.09
0.38 0.45
Telecom	&	Networks 0.058
t:	0.8
-0.26*
t:	.42
0.24*
t:	.44
-0.3
t:	0.5
0.43*
t:	.54
-0.28
t:	.00
0.8
t:	0.78
-0.22
t:	0.79
0.9 0.2
Planning	&	Mgmt. 0.22
t:	0.64
-0.08
t:	0.39
0.3
t:	0.52
0.2
t:	0.47
0.4***
t:	2.45
-0.28
t:	0.9
0.2
t:	.07
0.27
t:	.35
0.6 0.28
All	IS	functions 0.06
t:	0.5
0.05
t:	0.88
0.08
t:	0.38
0.06*
0.4
0.56***
t:	3.7
0.09*
t:	0.77
0.34***
t:	5.32
0.2**
.32
0.3 0.6
***:	p<0,0[t
crit
=2,345];	**:	p<0,05[t
crit
=,653];	*:	p	<0,0[t
crit
=,286]
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ing exist with reference to large compa-
nies in Germany.9 A cross-cultural study 
could provide information as to whether 
or not outsourcing behavior in German-
speaking countries is significantly differ-
ent from other cultural regions. Third, the 
division of IS into five functions ignores 
the fact that these may further be divided 
into sub-functions. In applications devel-
opment, for example, the division could 
reflect the different developmental stages 
or a division of duties into single mod-
ules with diverse requirements for appli-
cations development (Alpar and Ein-Dor 
1991; Heiskanen et al. 1996). Moreover, the 
project level may be an appropriate unit of 
analysis for studying outsourcing decisions 
(Beath and Walker 1998; Sabherwal 1999). 
Fourth, the measurement instruments for 
the uncertainty construct have proven to 
be extremely heterogeneous. In future 
studies, the individual indicators should 
be treated as separate constructs with dif-
ferent causal influences on IS outsourcing 
(Sutcliffe and Zaheer 1998). Fifth, in this 
article, relationships were only observed 
on the macro-level. Each relationship is 
based on a number of behavioral assump-
tions on the micro level, i. e. the individ-
ual level. These assumptions could poten-
tially be incorporated as separate con-
structs, and their influence on the model 
structure could be hypothesized as inter-
mediators or moderators of relationships 
at the macro-level (Rindfleisch and Heide 
1997). Within the framework of TCE the-
ory, the measurement of opportunism or 
opportunistic behavior, in terms of behav-
ioral uncertainty, as well as the incorpora-
tion of trust could exceed the limitations 
of the neoclassical methodical individu-
alism (Ghoshal and Insead 1996; Noor-
derhaven 1996). During the exploration 
of relationships on the individual level, 
an exploratory research design using case 
studies could enhance our understand-
ing. In conclusion, it is to be noted that 
the question of IS outsourcing in small 
and medium-sized firms is no less excit-
ing than in large companies.
9	 	A	study	conducted	by	Alpar	and	Ein-Dor	
(99)	in	small	and	mid-sized	firms	in	the	USA	
showed	that	their	needs	differ	from	those	of	the	
larger	enterprises.	Whereas	small	and	mid-sized	
firms	focus	on	IS	quality	and	reliability,	large	
companies	focus	on	planning	and	management.
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Outsourcing of Information 
Systems Functions in Small and 
Medium Sized Enterprises: A Test 
of a Multi-Theoretical Model
In this paper determinants of information 
systems (IS) outsourcing are deduced 
from transaction cost economic theory, 
resource-based theory, and power 
theory. They are summarized in a 
theoretical framework which is tested 
using a sample of small and medium 
sized enterprises (SMEs) in Germany. The 
results show that internal performance 
and know-how deficits vis-à-vis external 
service providers are key determinants 
that explain why different IS functions 
are outsourced to varying degrees in 
SMEs. Moreover, the determinants of IS 
functions were found to partially differ 
between IS functions.
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